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Aging, Moving, and Housing Wealth
ABSTRACT
We have described the relationship between family attributes
and moving, and between moving and change in housing wealth.
Moving is often associated with retirement and with precipitating
shocks like the death of a spouse or by other changes in marital
status. Median housing wealth increases as the elderly age. Even
when the elderly move, housing equity is as likely to increase as
to decrease. Thus the typical mover is not liquidity constrained,
although some are. High transaction cost associated with moving
is apparently not the cause for the lack of the reduction in
housing wealth as the elderly age. The absence of a well
developed market for reverse mortgages may be explained by a lack
of demand for these financial instruments. The evidence suggests
that the typical elderly family does not wish to reduce housing
wealth to increase current consumption. For whatever reason,
there is apparently a considerable attachment among homeowners to
past housing.
Steven F. Ventj David A. Wise
Dartmouth College Kennedy School of Government
Hanover, NH03755 Harvard University
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by
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It is often claimed that the elderly live in inappropriate
housing. Indeed the claim is that many would like to live
elsewhere and would, were it not for the large transactions cost
associated with moving. These costs are understood to include not
only direct monetary costs, but also the psychic costs inherent in
changing neighborhoods, losing contact with longtime friends, and
the like. This reasoning has been the rationale for the belief
that reverse mortgage schemes would be of benefit to the elderly,
were the market for them easily accessible. This paper is the
first stage of research directed ultimately to analysis of the
transaction costs associated with elderly moving. It concentrates
on the empirical description of the relationship between moving
and housing expenditure of the elderly.
There are three themes in the paper: The first is directly
motivated by the hypothesis that a significant number of elderly
would like to use housing equity to finance current consumption,
were that possible without having to incur the large transaction
costs of moving. The proposition is not that the elderly live in
housing that is inappropriate for them and that they ought to
move. It is not, for example, that an elderly couple living in a
large house that it wants to leave to its children has made an
inappropriate housing choice. Rather the question is whether the
couple would like to use the housing resources for other purposes.
If this were the case, one might expect that when moves occurPage 2
wealth would be taken out of housing and used to finance current
consumption.
A second theme is the extent to which the elderly more
generally draw down housing equity as they age. It is well known
that a very large proportion of saving is in the form of housing
and that many of the elderly have essentially no other assets.
Venti and Wise [1986] report that the median level of financial
assets among respondents to the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances
was about $1,300. The median level of all assets (excluding
Social Security and firm pension plans) was $22,900, the vast
majority of which was in housing. Evidence on the assets of the
elderly is reported in Hurd and shoven [1983], Diamond and Hausman
[1984], and in Hurd and Wise [1987]. Diamond and Hausman, for
example, report that 20 percent of those aged 45 to 59 had
essentially no non-pension personal wealth in 1966. Nearly 50
percent had non—housing assets less than $1,000. Given that such
a large proportion of personal saving is in the form of housing,
one is led to ask whether it is used, as the life cycle theory
would predict, to finance consumption in old age. Third, the
descriptive analysis here is to serve as the first stage of
analysis of moving transaction costs among the elderly. It sets
forth the empirical regularities with which more formal modeling
and analysis must be consistent.
The analysis is based on the Retirement History Survey (BBS).
This survey follows for ten years families headed by persons who
were between 58 and 63 years old in 1969. They were reinterviewedPage 3
every two years until 1979. Data were collected on a wide variety
of socioeconomic measures, including income, wealth by detailed
asset category, retirement, health status, and many others.
Merrill [1984] used data from the 1969 and 1977 RIIS interviews to
study the home equity of the elderly. The focus of her work is
similar to ours, although the details of the two analysesare
quite different. In particular, we use each of the six RHS
interviews to analyze the moving and housing choices of the
elderly. By considering changes in each two—year interval, we are
able for the most part to associate changes in housing equity with
individual moves. By considering changes over short time
intervals, we also minimize the potential effects on the
conclusions of attrition from the sample. While our methods
differ from hers, her basic conclusions are supported by- our
findings.
The first section of the paper describes the frequency of
moving by type of housing and by the wealth and income of
respondents. Section two considers the correlates of moving. Who
moves? In particular, retirement and death of a spouse are
emphasized. In addition, we consider the relationship between
income and housing equity on the one hand, and moving on the
other. The desire to sell a house to finance current consumption
might be expected to be concentrated among persons with low
current income and relatively higher housing equity. We consider
whether there is in fact a concentration of moving among persons
in this income—housing—wealth group. The third section comparesPage 4
changes in housing value, housing equity, and user cost over time
for movers compared to non—movers (stayers). Non—housing
bequeathable wealth is also traced. If wealth is withdrawn from
housing at the time of a move, it should show up as an increase in
non—housing bequeathable wealth after the move.
The conclusions of the paper may be summarized briefly:
• The elderly typically do not use saving in the form of
housing equity to finance current consumption as they age,
contrary to the usual life cycle theory. Indeed, as
Bernheim (1984) and Merrill [1984) have reported, housing
equity increased with age over the period of the RHS.
•When the elderly move, they are as likely to increase as to
decrease housing equity. This suggests that the reason for
the virtual absence of a reverse mortgage market may be the
lack of demand for such financial arrangements. Even if
the transaction costs associated with moving deter many
elderly from changing housing, these costs are apparently
not what is causing the absence of consumption of housing
equity by the elderly. Those who do move don't, on
average, withdraw wealth from housing. Thus the typical
mover is apparently not liquidity constrained.
Many of the elderly with little current income also have
little housing equity, so that little could be gained by
converting it to an annuity, even at an actuarially fair
rate. This is consistent with the findings of Manchester
[1987], based on data from the Panel Survey of Income
Dynamics. That annuity rates are much less than
actuarially fair, as shown by Friedman and Warshawsky
(1985), may be a further deterrent.
The attachment to past living arrangements and the
maintenance of housing equity may be motivated by a bequest
motive, although this explanation is brought into question
by the absence of a significant relationship between change
in housing equity and whether the family has children,
consistent with the findings of Hurd [1986) for non—housing
bequeathable wealth.
The elderly with high income and low housing equity are the
most likely to move; those with low income and high housing
equity are less likely than the former group but more
likely than other elderly families to move. One mayPage 5
conclude that moving by the elderly is justas likely to be
motivated by the desire to reallocatemore income to
housing as to use housing wealth to finance current
consumption. However, among homeowners whomove, those
with low income and high housing equity reducehousing equity the most; those with high income and lowhousing equity increase housing wealth the most.
Moving is strongly related to retirement and to
precipitating shocks like change in marital status, in
particular the death of a spouse.
I. Background
A.The Frequency and Nature of Moves
Much of the data that will be presented pertains tochanges
in housing between two survey periods. Where thechanges do not
vary greatly over the five possible conlparisons-—1969 to 1971,
1971 to 1973, etc... ——wetypically present data for the 1973 to
1975 interval.
The likelihood that a family moves during a two-year interval
depends on housing type, as shown in the tabulation below.




Those who rent are almost three times as likely to move as those
who own. The "other" category includes persons living with
relatives, living in homes owned by others, or paying no cash
rent. Most moves are between the same housing tenure. This isPage 6
shown by a transition matrix for those who moved between 1973 and
1975.
Transition Matrix for Movers
Own Rent Other
Own 78.2 15.4 6.4
Rent 17.0 69.9 13.1
Other 22.6 41.2 36.2
Almost 80 percent of homeowners who move move to another house.
change in housing tenure occurs mostly among the elderly who live
in other situations. Thus when we consider changes in housing
type from one period to the next, we find that the vast majority
of people are in the same type of housing, except the small
prthportion of the elderly who are in the other housing category at
the beginning of the period, as shown below.
Transition Matrix for All
Own RentOther
Own 96.7 1.8 1.5
Rent 6.5 86.2 7.3
Other 15.1 20.1 64.8
Finally, some people who don't move do in fact change housing
tenure. Some rent the housing they used to own, and vice—versa.
Ownership of others may be transferred to children or to otherPage 7
relatives. In still other cases someone elsemay assume the rent
obligation. Change in tenure without moving is especially common
among those in the other category.1 This can be seen in a
transition matrix for stayers (non—movers).
Transition Matrix for Stayers
Own RentOther
Own 98.6 0.5 1.0
Rent 2.8 91.9 5.3
Other 12.4 12.475.2
The transition matrices for the other years look similar to
those for the 1973—1975 period. The transition probabilities for
movers vary with age, however. The RHS respondents were 62 to 67
years old in 1973. In the 1973—1975 interval, renters were more
likely to change to owning than owners were to change to renting.
Transition probabilities for movers by age can be calculated from
the RHS by combining data from all of the survey years. Only for
the ages 60 through 65 (but not 63) is the transition probability
from renting to owning greater than the probability from owning to
renting; for all other ages from 58 to 71 the reverse is true. In
1There may of course be response and coding errors in the
data. And they may be concentrated among respondents reported to
be in the other category.Page 8
this respect the RHS data appear to be consistent with evidence
from the Annual Housing Survey (AilS).2
An indication of the cumulative effect of these transition
probabilities over the ten year period of the RHS is provided by
the likelihood of moving between 1969 and 1979 for those who
responded in both years. The percent of respondents who moved at
least once during this period is:




2According to the 1973 MIS, 23 percent of owners with heads
aged 62 to 64 who moved changed to renting; 32 percent of renters
who moved changed to owning. Of those aged 65 and older, the
percents were 39 and 15 respectively. (See U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development (1979], Table a—7.) Excluding the -othercategory, apparently making the data more comparable with












Although the RHS samples families and the MIS structures, the
data from the two surveys do not appear to be inconsistent. We do
not know whether other differences between the surveys should be
expected to yield differences in the results from the two surveys.Page 9
Many movers, especially renters, moved more than once. Of the
original owners who moved and were in the sample in1979, 73
percent moved once, 18 percent twice, and 9 percent more than
twice. Of the original renters who moved, 50percent moved once,
24 percent twice, and 26 percent more than twice. Thetransition
matrix for all respondents describes the net result of thesemoves
over the ten—year period.
Ten—Year Transition Matrix for All
Own Rent Other
Own 90.3 6.6 3.1
Rent 23.0 68.3 8.7
Other26.6 31.8 41.6
There is considerably more movement from renting to owning than
from owning to renting. Most of the original owners still own; 7
percent rent. But 23 percent of original renters own at the end
of the period. The reason is that renters are much more likely
than owners to move, not that when renters move they are more
likely than owners to switch tenures, as explained above. Some of
the initial respondents died and others dropped out of the sample
for other reasons. This attrition may have some effect on the
recorded transition probabilities. Renters, for example, are more
likely than owners to drop out of the sample. We do not believe,Page 10
however, that attrition seriously confo;nds the interpretation of
the data.
Persons who buy often move out of state; renters are much
less likely to leave the state. The RHS provides limited
information on the distance of moves in the 1973-1975 period. For
initial owners and renters, distance is indicated in the
tabulation below, where the entries are percents.
PercentDistribution ofthe
DistanceofMoves, 1973—1975
Type of Same Same Out of Other All
Move City State State
Own to own 35.8 29.2 22.6 12.3 43.2
Rent to rent 69.9 17.9 8.8 3.4 36.6
Own to rent 44.7 32.9 14.1 8.2 10.5
Rent to own 33.3 34.6 21.8 10.3 9.7
All 49.0 26.0 16.6 8.4 100.0
Half of moves are within the same city and three-fourths within
the same state.3 Almost 90 percent of moves from one rental unit
to another are within the same state.
B.Wealth and Income
Income and wealth by tenure are shown for 1969 in tables la
and lb. Since a large proportion of personal wealth is in
3The "same state" percents in the tabulation exclude the
"same city".Page 11
housing, it is not surprising that homeowners have much more
wealth than renters. Owners also have much higher incomes. And
they have much more non—housing bequeathable wealth and more
Social Security wealth, the latter reflecting higher lifetime
earnings.
The extent to which housing equity could be used to increase
current consumption depends of course on how much housing equity
there is. The extent to which individuals might wish to do that
may depend on housing equity compared to current income. For
example, persons with low income but large housing equity stand to
gain the most by converting housing equity into current
consumption. An indication of the potential for such transfers is
provided by the distribution of housing equity by income.4 It is
shown below by the income and housing equity quartiles of home
owners •
4lncomeincludes wages, capital income, pension income, and
Social Security income.
5The income quartiles are: <$5,400, $5,400—$10,65l, $10,651—
$17,902, and $17,902+. The housing equity quartiles are:
<$16,334; $l6334—$27,767; $27,767—$45,407; and $45,407+. The non—
housing wealth quartiles are: <$64,254; $64,254—$101,599;
$lOl,599—$152,73l; and $152,731+.Page 12
Distribution of Housing Eauity by Income. 1973
Housing Eauity
Income low 2nd 3rd 4th
low 41.0 26.0 18.3 14.8
2nd 26.5 27.0 26.7 19.8
3rd 18.6 27.3 31.0 23.1
4th 8.9 19.7 28.4 43.0
Over 40 percent of those in the lowest income quartile also are in
the lowest housing equity quartile.
Thus a reverse mortgage may not expand much the opportunity
for this group to increase current consumption. For example,
consider a family with housing wealth of $16,334, the maximum in
the lowest housing equity quartile (1979 dollars). Assume
approximate average male life expectancy at 65 of 15 years.
Suppose that the household obtains a loan for the value of the
house and uses the proceeds from the loan to buy an annuity. If
both the mortgage rate and the annuity "yiel& are 10 percent, the
annual income from the reverse annuity mortgage would be only
$548. In fact, this is an overestimate. The annuity yield is
typically much lower than the mortgage rate. In 1979, the average
mortgage rate was 10.8 percent and the average annuity yield 4.8
percent.6 With these rates, the income from the reverse annuity
6See Friedman and Warshawsky [1985].Page 13
mortgage would be negative, —$212 per annum.
Housing equity together with other wealth is possibly a
better measure of consumption possibilities. Their joint
distribution is shown below.
Distribution of Housing Equity by Other Wealth, 1973
Housing Equity
Other
Wealth low 2nd 3rd 4th
low 45.6 27.6 18.1 8.8
2nd 28.4 30.2 26.3 15.2
3rd 14.7 26.0 33.2 26.2
4th 6.4 16.2 26.8 50.2
Again, those with little non-housing wealth tend to have little
housing equity as well. Close to half of those in the lowest non—
housing wealth quartile are also in the lowest housing equity
quartile and almost three quarters are in the lowest half. Data
for other years look very similar to those for 1973.
II. Who Moves?
A.Descrintive Data
The likelihood of moving is highest for those with an
apparent imbalance in income versus housing equity. The percent
that moved during the 1973-1975 period by income and housing
equity quartiles is shown for homeowners in the matrices below;Page 14
the first presents the data by income and housing equity and the
second by housing equity and other wealth.
Percent Move by Income and Housing Equity 1973-75
Housing Equity
Income low 2nd 3rd 4th All
low 12 7 10 16 11
2nd 8 7 10 8 8
3rd 10 7 7 8 8
4th 16 8 8 10 10
All 11 7 9 10 9
Percent Move by Other Wealth and Housing Equity 1973-75
Other Housing Equity
Wealth low 2nd 3rd 4th All
low 10 6 10 9 9
2nd 9 7 8 11 8
3rd 11 8 9 9 9
4th 20 9 8 10 10
All 11 7 9 10 9
The most striking feature of these data is that persons who have
relatively high non—housing wealth, but low housing equity are the
most likely to move. Persons in the highest non-housing wealth
quartile are more than twice as likely to move if they have low
rather than high housing equity. Families with low non-housingPage 15
wealth but high housing equity are not unusually likely to move,
contrary to what would be expected if moving typically were used
to withdraw wealth from housing and reallocate it to current
consumption.
According to the first matrix, however, families with high
housing equity but low income are about as likely to move as
families with high income but low housing equity. Persons with
high incomes but devoting relatively little of it to housing may
move to reallocate more of their income to housing. This may
simply reflect optimal adjustment to desired housing expenditure,
given current circumstances. But it may also be a response in
part to government policies. Medicaid rules, for example, often
require virtual exhaustion of non—housing wealth, but not housing
equity, before nursing home expenses are paid. Families with low
income but high housing equity, may move to withdraw wealth from
housing; they may be liquidity constrained. The evidence in the
next section supports these presumptions.
In principle, homeowners could withdraw wealth from housing
by increasing the mortgage on the house. Presumably those with
the most housing wealth would be in the best position to do this.
And indeed housing equity could be increased by paying off a
mortgage. But change in the amount of home mortgages has been
rare in the absence of a move. Thus in practice it would appear
that moving is typically the mechanism by which housing wealth has
been increased or decreased. Recent tax legislation that
eliminates the tax deductibility of interest on consumerPage 16
borrowing, other than mortgages, may change the frequency of home
equity loans, however.
The probability that a renter moves shows little relationship
to income, to wealth, or to rent. In particular, it does not
appear that families with high rent and low income, or with low
income and high rent, are more likely than others to move. The
percent of renters who move is shown by income and total wealth
quartile and by income and rent quartile below.
Renters % Move by Income and Total Wealth 1973—75
Total Wealth
Income low 2nd 3rd 4th All
low 26 25 35 15 26
2nd 35 25 26 10 27
3rd 30 30 23 31 27
4th 29 19 18 26 23
All 29 26 24 25 26
Renters % Move by Income and Rent 1973—75
Rent
Income low 2nd 3rd 4th All
low 24 28 29 24 26
2nd 27 25 27 30 27
3rd 32 22 24 33 27
4th 24 15 23 26 23
All 26 24 25 28 26Page 17
Moving is often associated with job change. Among the
elderly, it is more likely to be associated with retirement. it
is also strongly associated with precipitating shocks, the death
of a spouse in particular. The relationship of moving to
retirement is shown in table 2 and to death of aspouse in table
Homeowners are about twice as likely to move if the
respondent retires during the two—year interval than if retirement
does not occur.8 The difference is also substantial, although
somewhat less, for renters. The death of the respondent almost
doubles the likelihood that homeowners and renters move during
many of the two year intervals. (The effect of change in family
size is shown in appendix table 1. The numbers are close to those
pertaining to death of a spouse in table 3, although change in
family size could occur for many other reasons, as well as death
of the respondent.)
Possibly the most informative description of the relationship
between age and moving is the empirical hazard rate, the percent
7Respondents are defined to be retired if they report that
they are retired or that they are partially retired but are
neither working nor looking for work.
81n the beginning of the ten-year RI-IS period, most of those
who don't retire during a two—year interval are still working,
while by the end of the period most who don't retire are already
retired. The data in table 2 show that the probability of moving
is about the same for both groups, judging from the percents in
the 1969—1971 and 1977—1979 intervals for example——6.7 and 7.2
respectively.Page 18
of families who move in the next two—year interval, given that
they have not moved before that. These calculations are shown
below, by survey year and by age.
Hazard Rates for Homeowners
Year at the Beginning of the Interval
19691971 1973 1975 1977 All
58 7.2 7.2
59 7.4 7.4
60 9.3 7.9 8.6
61 7.7 9.7 8.6
62 7.9 7.9 7.8 7.9
63 8.1 9.0 7.4 8.2
64 8.8 8 9 7.5 8.4
65 9.9 8.2 6.1 8.3
66 7.0 6.4 7.6 7.0
67 6.5 6.5 4.7 6.0
68 6.2 5.7 6.0
69 6.3 4.5 5.4
70 7.0 7.0
71 6.3 6.3
All 7.9 8.8 7.7 6.6 6.0 7.6
For example, 7.2 percent of the homeowners who were 58 in 1969
moved in the next two years, by 1971. Looking down the last
column, there appears to be a slight increase in the probability
of moving at the peak retirement years, 60 to 65, and possibly
some decline with age, although both effects are slight. There
appear to be no important cohort effects, judging by the
similarity of the percents for people of the same age in different
years. One might expect that not moving for several years would
tend to identify stayers versus movers. If this selection effect
exists, it should be revealed by declining moving probabilitiesPage 19
along the diagonals, that pertain to the same cohort as itages.
Those who enter each successive calculation have not moved for
longer and longer periods of time. For all cohorts this effect is
summarized in the bottom row. Any such effect does not showup
strongly in this tabulation, although possibly indicated by the
decline from around 8 percent in 1971 to about 6 percent in 1979.
Whatever this effect is, it may be indistinguishable from the
effect of age. Calculations below will help to make the
distinction clearer, however.
Comparable data for renters are shown in the next tabulation.
Hazard Rates for Renters
Year at the Beginning of the Interval
19691971 1973 1975 1977 All
58 24.1 24.1
59 29.1 29.1
60 31.5 24.8 28.5
61 28.8 26.0 27.7
62 29.823.0 14.1 24.7
63 32.024.9 15.6 26.1
64 19.0 24.6 20.9 20.9
65 26.0 23.8 12.5 21.8
66 19.3 18.5 17.8 18.7
67 20.6 14.7 15.8 17.3
68 22.0 11.6 19.8
69 14.4 13.9 19.1
70 16.5 16.5
71 25.4 25.4
All 29.1 23.8 19.4 17.5 16.7 23.7
The data for renters suggest a rather strong selection of stayers
in the sample, after successive periods without moving. There is
on average a substantial decline in the probability of moving as
the number of years without moving increases, summarized in thePage 20
bottom row.9 On the other hand, there seems to be little effect
of age, judged by looking down the columns.
B. Paraineterizatjon of Hazard Rates
Finally, these hazard rates are parameterized as simple
functions of age, retirement, marital status, health status, and
income-housing equity quartiles. Given that a person has not yet
moved at the time of a survey, the probability of moving by the
next survey is estimated as a function of these variables, using a
probit functional font. Those who move in a given interval are
deleted from the calculations for subsequent intervals. The use
of the probit font for the interval probability of moving is
consistent with a Brownian motion formulation of a continuous time
hazard model.1°
The Brownian motion version of a hazard model may be
described briefly. Suppose that at age t there is a gain G(t)
that could be obtained by moving. It may be thought of as
9To the extent that this progressive selection of stayers
versus movers is important, more formal analysis should account
for it.It must also recognize that persons are observed in mid
tenure at the beginning of the survey, some have moved recently
while others have been in the same dwelling for many years,
sometimes referred to as left censoring. From these data,
however, we know how long homeowners have been living in the
current residence and that will be accounted of in subsequent
analysis.
-0Strictly speaking, this is only true if a move is "non—
absorbing". In our case it is absorbing. The probit estimates,
however, provide accurate descriptions of the hazard rates over
the two—year intervals. See for example Hausinan and Wise (1985].Page 21
G(t) =M(t)-S(t),where M(t) is the utility associated with
moving to the best available alternative housing and S(t) is the
utility associated with staying in the present location. The
probability of moving is given by Pr[G(t) =M(t)—S(t)>oj.
That G(t) follows a Brownian motion (Weiner)process with
drift u means that:
• Every increment G(t+d) -G(t)is normally distributed with
mean ud and variance c2d; and
-Theincrements for every pair of disjoint time intervals
are independent.
Because the increments are assumed to be independent, given G(t),
G(t+d) is a function only of G(t) and the drift u.
If moving is not an absorbing state, meaning that a person
could move and then move back again ——nota realistic possibility
in our case ——theprobability that a person who has not moved by
age t will move by age t +dis given by
(1) Pr[G(t+d) >0G(t) =g(t)]=F[{g(t)+ud}/cdV2],
where F is a cumulative normal distribution function. This is an
interval hazard rate with a simple probit functional form.
If moving is an absorbing state, a family could not be in the
same house at the beginning and at the end of the period but have
moved during the interval. In this case, the interval hazard
becoines
See Cox and Miller [1965].Page 22
(2) Pr[G(t+d) >0G(t) =g(t)]=F[(g(t)+ud)/cdV2]
+exp[2ug(t)/c2pF{{g(t)—ud}/cdV2]
In our case, d is two years and the starting point g(t) must
be estimated. We parameterize u as a function of age; housing
equity and current income; and changes in retirement, marital, and
health status. If the interval d is defined to be 1 and c is set
to 1, equation (1) is in the form of a standard probit
specification. (The variance c is not identified if there is no
variation in d.) The results for the absorbing state version of
the hazard tell the same story as those using the simple model and
are not presented.
An advantage of estimating the interval hazards period by
period is that the effect of each variable is allowed to vary
freely as persons age. The results for the simple probit are
reported in tables 4a and 4b. Table 4a is based on all intervals
combined, while table 4b presents estimates for selected intervals
separately. The last column of the tables shows the change in the
probability of moving due to each of the attributes. The change
is evaluated at the mean of all of the other attributes. For
example, if the sixteen variables describing home equity and
income in table 4a are set to zero -—identifyinga family with
high income and high housing equity -—andall of the others are
set at their means, the probability of moving is .084. If instead
of high housing and high income, the family had low housing equityPage 23
and high income, the probability of moving would be .084 +.047=
.131,or .047 higher.
The estimates support several conclusions. First, as
indicated in the summary tables above, moving is often related to
retirement and is often precipitated by the death of aspouse or
by other changes in marital status. For example, based on the
estimates for all intervals combined, in table 4a, the probability
that a homeowner moves increases from .046 to .101 (.046 +.055)
if the head retires. The probability that the typical married
couple moves is .066. If the husband dies during the interval,
the probability is .118. other changes in marital status, like
divorce or marriage, are much more likely to be associated with a
move. In these cases, the probability of a move is .426 (.066 +
.360)12
The estimated coefficients on the income-housing equity
indicators in table 4a show that the probability of moving is
greatest for families with the greatest apparent imbalance in
income versus housing equity. The estimated hazard rates for the
three home equity and income levels distinguished in the probit
specification, assuming other attributes at their sample means
are:
12other studies also report substantial increases in mobility
associated with these demographic shocks. See Feinstein and
McFadden [1987] in this volume, who report the effects of both
retirement and changes in family composition; and Merrill (1984],
who reports the effects of retirement, also based on the RI-IS.Page 24
Estimated Hazard Rates
by Income and Home Equity. Homeowners
Housing Eauity
Income low 2nd 3rd 4th
low 6.6 5.2 6.6 9.7
2nd 7.7 6.4 5.9 6.9
3rd 7.9 5.5 5.5 7.2
4th 13.1 7.1 7.7 8.4
Theaveragehazard rate is 7.6 percent. Holding other attributes
constant, the hazard rate for families with high income and low
housing equity is 13.1 percent. Those with low income and high
housing equity are somewhat less likely to move, although they are
more likely than the average. These estimates provide no evidence
that homeowners typically use housing wealth to increase current
consumption. The results in this section together with those
below suggest that persons with high incomes and low housing
equity are likely to move to increase housing expenditure1 while
those with low income and high housing equity tend to reduce
housing equity when they move. Data in the next section show that
movers in general do not reduce housing equity.
Change in health status has little effect on the probability
of moving, according to our measures. An improvement in health is
associated with a .019 increase in the probability of moving, from
.067 to .086. A worsening of health status is associated with a
.001 decline in the probability of moving.Page 25
The parameter estimates show no effect ofage on moving.
That is, age at the beginning of a twoyear period is unrelated to
the probability of moving. Note that these variables indicate
ages that are two years greater with each successive interval,
beginning with 58 at the beginning of the 1969-1971 interval. The
year effects, indicated by the first year of each of the two year
intervals, are small but declining consistently. They reflect the
increasing selection of stayers as the number of years without a
move increases. The estimates indicate that those who have not
moved before 1977, are .024 less likely to move in the subsequent
two-year interval than the typical person in the sample in 1969 is
to move by 1971, .078.
Estimates of the effect of individual attributes on the
hazard rates of renters are shown in table 5 for all survey
intervals combined. As with homeowners, retirement and changes in
marital status have substantial effects on probability of moving.
There is no age effect. Unlike homeowners, however, there are
substantial year effects on the probability that renters move,
indicating substantial and increasing selection of stayers as the
number of years without a move increases. The hazard rate
declines from .294 in the 196g—l97l interval to .151 in the 1977—
1979 interval. As shown in the tabulation below, low income
families are somewhat more likely to move, but there is no
relationship between rent and the likelihood of moving.Page 26
Estimated Hazard Rates
by Income and Rent Ouartile.Renters
Rent
Income low 2nd 3rd 4th
low 25.2 27.8 24.5 25.5
2nd 26.1 22.5 22.7 23.3
3rd 21.0 21.1 22.0 24.6
4th 21.1 15.1 24.2 21.2
III. Moving. Housing Value, and User Cost
It has been shown that only about 8 or 9 percent of
homeowners move in any two-year period and that only about 25
percent moved over the entire ten—year period. Renters are much
more likely to move; about a quarter move in any two—year period
and almost 65 percent of initial renters had moved at least once
by 1979. Retirement and death of a spouse are strong
precipitating factors associated with moving.
In this section we consider how housing equity and user cost
change with moving. In particular, we analyze the extent to which
wealth is withdrawn from housing at the time of moving. The
market value of housing and housing equity are the principle
measures that are analyzed for homeowners.
In addition, we consider the change in non—housing
bequeathable wealth. If wealth is withdrawn from housing at the
time of a move, it should show up as an increase in non—housing
bequeathable wealth. This provides a check on the housing equityPage 27
data. For example, persons may undervalue their houses,
especially during a period of increasing housing prices. When the
person moves and a new house is bought, its actual market value is
revealed. The difference between this value and the estimated
value of the previous house could exaggerate the increase in
housing value when at the time of a move. The change in non—
housing bequeathable wealth would not be subject to this potential
bias, however)-3 If the elderly typically have more wealth in
housing than they would like, we would expect to see a fall in
housingequity, and an increase in non—housing bequeathable
wealth, among those who move.
Change in rent is determined for renters. In addition, we
followthe change in the user cost of housing for both homeowners
and renters. This provides a measure that is comparable for both
groups. It also is a direct indicator of the extent to which the
elderly move to reduce such expenditure. We find that the typical
move is just as likely to be associated with an increase as a
decrease in housing equity and that user cost is also just as
likely to increase as to decrease.
-3In addition, housing value and other wealth measures have
been imputed when they are missing. To the extent that this
introduces error in the measurements used here, the error should
be less for bequeathable wealth, which is composed of several
individually reported categories. We also calculated the change
in the housing equity and housing value of movers based only on
the reported values of those who responded to the relevant
questions. The results were virtually the same as those obtained
using imputations for the missing values. We are indebted to
Michael Hurd for putting together a very complete and detailed
asset tape from the RHSoriginaldata.Page 28
A. Housing Value, Eauity.andNon-Housing Begueathab].e
Wealth
Twotypesof analysis are discussed. The first is based on
changes between adjacent survey years. In this case, the sample
includes all homeowners in the sample in each of the twosurvey
periods. The second is based only on respondents who remained in
the sample over the entire period of the RHS. This has the
advantage of providing data on families both before and after a
move. On the other hand, effects of attrition may have a more
substantial effect on the calculations when only those who remain
in the survey for ten years are included in the analysis.
Attrition is unlikely to have an important effect on the
calculations based on two—year intervals.14
Table 6 shows the change in the market value of housing,
housing equity, and non—housing bequeathable wealth for movers and
stayers over each two—year interval of the RHS. The comparison
with stayers provides a control for economy wide changes during
each interval. In two of the six intervals, the change in housing
value for movers is greater than for stayers. In four of the five
intervals more than half of the changes for movers were positive.
The equity value of housing was also as likely to increase as to
decrease when a move occurred. The median change in equity value
was usually somewhat less for movers than for stayers, however, on
14Merrill [1984] used only families in the sample in both
1969 and 1977.Page 29
the order of $1,500 or $2,000. In four of the five periods, the
fall in non—housing bequeathable wealth was greater formovers
than for stayers. This may be the clearest evidence that wealth
is not typically withdrawn from housing at the time ofa move.
The percent with a fall in non-housing bequeathable wealthwas
typically almost the same for movers as for stayers.
An alternative description of these measures is presented in
appendix table 2.It shows housing value, housing equity, and
non-housing bequeathable wealth for those who were homeowners
during the entire period of the RHS. The data distinguish
families by whether they moved or stayed during a particular two-
year interval, and show the values in each of the other years of
the survey as well. Illustrative findings are graphed in figures
la, lb, and lc. The first of each pair of graphs distinguishes
those who moved between 1969 and 1971 from those who didn't.
Persons in either of these move or stay groups may have moved g
stayed in subsequent years. The second of each pair distinguishes
movers and stayers in the 1975-1977 interval. Median home value
increased over the RHS period for both movers and stayers. Movers
typically had greater housing value than stayers. The median home
value of movers always increased at the time of the move. The
median equity value of housing always declines somewhat at the
time of the move, but increases thereafter. Movers have more
housing equity than stayers, based on these data for those whoPage 30
remained in the survey for its duration.15 And the difference is
typically about as large at the end of the RHS period as at the
beginning.
Median non—housing bequeathable wealth declines continuously
for both movers and stayers, and at approximately the same rate.
At the time of the mOve it is as likely to decrease as to
increase. (It decreases in both of the graphs that are shown.)
Again, the typical elderly mover appears to withdraw little if any
housing equity at the time of the move.'6
Finally, we have estimated by linear regression the
relationship between family attributes and the change in hone
equity when the family moves (to another owner—occupied dwelling).
(See table 7.) The variables are the same as those used to
estimate the interval hazard rates above. We emphasize the
relationship between the change in housing equity on the one hand
and initial income versus housing equity on the other.
3-5The analysis based on adjacent survey years indicates the
opposite.
16An apparent anomoly in the data is that among the few
homeowners who are reported to move to rental housing, there is no
appreciable increase in non—housing bequeathable wealth, although
the medians are positive. Indeed, the sum of the change in
housing wealth and the change in non-housing bequeathable wealth
is negative, at the median, for this group. In part, the moves
are associated with the death of the husband and we know from Hurd
and Wise (1987] in this volume that substantial wealth is lost at
the death of the husband. In addition, some wealth may be
transfered to children. Symmetrically, there is an increase in
the reported sum of the changes in these two categories among
families who move from renting to owning. We have been unable to
find a complete explanation.Page 31
Because of reporting errors, there is a tendency for those
who report an unusually high level of income or homeequity in one
survey year to report a lower level in the next. In other words,
errors in variables create a regression toward the mean. To
correct for this, we estimate the change in housing equity forall
homeowners, identifying separately those who move. Thus, for
example, the estimated reduction in home equity for families who
move and who report low income and high home equity in the first
year of a two—year interval is the difference between the
reduction for movers and the reduction for stayers; the regression
toward the mean is netted out. The mean change in home equity for
movers is shown below:
Mean Change in Home Equity for Movers
by Income and Home Equity
Housing Equity quartile
Income Low 2nd 3rd 4th
Low $4,683 $3,007 $2,114 —$16,377
2nd 5,219 2,683 1,916—13,790
3rd 5,393 1,381 —4,236 —9,479
4th 8,396 9,375 4,218 —4,503
Families with low income and high housing wealth reduce
housing equity when they move. On the other hand, families with
high income and low housing wealth, increase equity substantially
at the time of the move. Overall, movers are as likely to
increase as to decrease housing equity.Page 32
Homeowners apparently do not typically move to withdraw
wealth from housing. They do not, in general, move to relieve a
liquidity constraint, although some apparently do. Indeed, there
is a somewhat greater tendency for moves to be associated with
high income elderly who want to spend more on housing than with
low income families with high housing wealth who want to withdraw
wealth from housing.
Like the housing equity of stayers, the equity of movers
tends to increase from year to year before and after the move. Of
course, the increase in home value in the absence of a move
reflects the economy—wide trend in housing prices over the period
of the R}IS, not necessarily a conscious decision to increase
saving through housing equity. The change at the time of a move
presumably does reflect conscious intention. Non—housing
bequeathable wealth fell over time and usually more for movers
than for stayers. In considering lifecycle theories of saving,
housing equity is usually thought of jointly with, and like, other
forms of saving, presumably to be consumed in old age. These data
suggest that this view is not correct for housing. Non—housing
bequeathable wealth is observed to fall with age. Most housing
will apparently be left as a bequest, judging by the behavior of
the R11S respondents through age 73.
This does not necessarily suggest that to leave a bequest is
the reason that housing equity is not consumed. Indeed the change
in housing equity at the time of a sale by elderly persons without
children is about the same as the change for those with children.Page 33
Housing equity increases for about half of movers ineach group.
The same is true for the market value ofhousing. There is some
evidence that non—housing bequeathable wealthfalls less for
movers with than without children. The differencesare not
substantial, however. This suggests that theelderly may well be
attached to their homes for reasons other thanor in addition to
the bequest motive. 17
B.Moving and Rent
The rent of stayers typically declines overtime, as shown in
table 8. On the other hand, the median rent ofmovers usually
increases. The initial rent of movers andstayers is about the
same. An alternative description of the data ispresented in
appendix table 3. Like comparable tables forowners, it
distinguishes movers and stayers in each twoyear interval, but
also shows rents in each of the otheryears of the RHS as well.
The respondents used in this table rented in each of theyears.
Typical rents are graphed in figure 2. Those who don't move have
declining rents. Thus there appears to be a substantial benefit
to remaining in the same rental unit. Rent increases ofstayers
do not keep up with the rate of inflation. Indeed thisapparent
rent advantage to continuing renters may provide an incentive not
to move.
17 See similarevidence in Hurd [l986J, that pertains to non-
housing bequeathable wealth.Page 34
The rent of movers increases at the time of the move, but
typically declines in other years, reflecting the lower price
faced by sitting tenants. For example, the rents of those who
moved between 1971 and 1973 declined somewhat between 1969 and
1971, then increased sharply at the time of the move, and declined
thereafter. Of course, both the movers and stayers in the 19 69—
1971 period could have roved in subsequent or in earlier years.
C.User Cost
User cost provides a measure that is comparable for both
owners and renters. It includes rent, mortgage payments, heat,
electricity, gas, water, and trash removal. The change in user
cost by tenure and move type is shown in table 9•18 The median
change in the user cost of movers who own in both years is
typically small and close to the change for non—movers.
Consistent with the rent data in the previous section, the change
in user cost for renters who move is usually positive and is
always greater than the change for stayers. The median increase
in user cost for those who move from owner—occupied to rental
housing is in the neighborhood of $800 per year. Between 60 and
70 percent of the increases are positive for this group. The
median change for those who move from rental to owner—occupied
t8secause of a change in the wording of some of the survey
questions used to calculate user cost, the 1969 data are
inconsistent with data for subsequent years. For this reason 1969
figures are deleted from the graphs.Page 35
housing is negative in each interval, but much smaller thanthe
increase for those who make the reversemove. Positive changes
are almost as likely as negative ones.
User cost in each year of the survey is shown infigure 3, by
move status in selected two-year intervals. It iseasy to see
that median user cost increases at the time of themove. In most
other years user cost declined for both movers andstayers.
Again, it is important to keep in mind that members of either
group could have moved or stayed in intervals other than the one
used for classification.
IV. Summary and Conclusions
We have described the relationship between family attributes
and moving, and between moving and change in housing wealth.
Moving is often associated with retirement and with precipitating
shocks like the death of a spouse or by other changes in marital
status. Median housing wealth increases as the elderlyage. Even
when the elderly move, housing equity is as likely to increaseas
to decrease. (Although the RHS only follows persons throughage
73, Garber [1987] in this volume reports no decline (in fact an
increase) from age 70 through age 95 for non—institutionalized
households, based on the National Long—Ten Care Survey.) The
user cost of housing typically increases for both homeowners and
renters when they move. Holding other attributes constant,
families with high income and low housing wealth are as likely toPage 36
move as those with low incomes and high housing wealth. The
median housing equity of families in the firstgroup increases
when they move and the median of the secondgroup decreases. Thus
the typical mover is not liquidity constrained,although
apparently some are. High transaction cost associated with moving
is apparently not the cause of the increase inhousing wealth as
the elderly age. Apparently, the absence of a welldeveloped
market for reverse mortgages may be explained by a lack of demand
for these financial instruments. The evidence suggests that the
typical elderly family does not wish to reduce housing wealth to
increase current consumption. For whatever reason, there is
apparently a considerable attachment among homeowners to their
habitual housing.
While our analysis is based on quantitative data, the
conclusions are also consistent with qualitative information from
the KHS. When asked why they moved, only 9 to 14 percent of
homeowners and 15 to 17 percent of renters indicated that the
reason for moving was "to save money". Only 11 percent of
homeowners and 12 percent of renters gave as a reason for wanting
to move that they would like to "reduce cost and work of upkeep".
Observed choices when moves were made confirm these stated
preferences; indeed, saving money was not pervasive.Page 37
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Tenure
Owners Renters Other
Category Mean Median Mean Median MeanMedian
1969
Capital Income $1008$59 $558$ 0 $467$ 0
Social Security 432 0 418 0 475 0
Pension 653 0 444 0 422 0
Wages 1495113210 10203 8448 5269 2166
Other 986 119 632 67 541 55
TOTAL 1803014810 12254 9484 7173 4049
N 6616 2426 792
1979
Capital Income 1741 223 895 0 426 0
Social Security 3829 3700 3064 3011 2543 2436
Pension 1980 0 1375 0 640 0
Wages 2389 0 1232 0 973 0
Other 954 120 572 45 487 36
TOTAL 1347610756 8276 6114 6052 4628
N 5228 1526 569









Housing 31026. 25739 0 0 0 0
Social Security 3927444535 3008729705 2113019499
Pension 16222 0 16776 0 14949 0
Other 6274 0 3118 0 5520 0
TOTAL 161806 110454 8224852762 57837 37732
N 6616 2426 792
1979
Non-Housing
Bequeathable 4626217476 21480 4710 13919 3116
Bousing 4173533000 0 0 0 0
Social Security 4507844528 3131929556 24779 23464
Pension 7220 0 5564 0 2629 0
Other 12468 0 4518 0 5774 0
TOTAL 176544 138461 8018458816 6290548548
N 5228 1526 569
a. All figures are in 1979 dollars.Table 2.Percent That Moves, by Retirement, Tenure, and Year.
All Ownersa Rentersa
Retired: 1969-1971 21.5 12.9 38.5
Did not retire: 1969-1971 12.7 6.7 26.5
Retired: 1971-1973 18.4 12.6 35.1
Did not retire: 1971-1973 14.5 8.8 28.5
Retired: 1973-1975 18.3 12.4 33.8
Did not retire: 1973-1975 13.0 8.3 24.1
Retired: 1975-1977 16.1 9.2 33.8
Did not retire: 1975-1977 12,2 7.6 25.0
Retired: 1977-1979 14.7 11.1 26.3
Did not retire: 1977-1979 10.9 7.2 20.5
a. In base year.Table 3. Percent That Move, by Death of Spouse, Tenure, and Year.
All Ownersa Rentersa
Death of original respondent,
1969-1971 22.5 16.4 42.0
No death, 1969-1971 14.3 7.7 28.8
Death of original respondent,
1971-1973 23.0 17.4 43.5
No death, 1971-1973 15.1 9.5 29.6
Death of original respondent,
1973-1975 20.8 12.2 50.0
No death, 1973-1975 13.7 9.0 25.2
Death of original respondent,
1975-1977 18.5 11.9 50.0
No death, 1975-1977 12.5 7.6 25.5
Death of original respondent,
1977-1979 15.8 13.2 29.3
No death, 1977-1979 11.0 7.3 20.7
a. In base year.Table 4a. Probit Estimates of Interval Hazards for Homeowners,
All Intervals Combineda
Asymptotic
Variable Coefficient Standard ErrorA Probability
Age at Beginning of Period
58 0.0 -- 0.075b
59 0.018 0.085 0.003
60 0.015 0.074 0.002
61 0.016 0.075 0.002
62 -0.035 0.074 -0.005
63 -0.069 0.074 -0.009
64 -0.030 0.083 -0.004
65 -0.030 0.084 -0.004
66 -0.050 0.093 -0.007
67 -0.129 0.095 -0.017
68 -0.095 0.107 -0.013
69 -0.154 0.110 -0.020
70 0.017 0.131 0.002
71 -0.040 0.135 -0.005
Year at Beginning of Period
1969 0.0 -- 0.078b
1971 0.008 0.041 0.001
1973 -0.069 0.051 -0.010
1975 -0.141 0.065 -0.019
1977 -0.187 0.080 -0.024
Home Equity-Income Quartile
low-low -0.124 0.056 -0.018
low-2nd -0.049 0.059 -0.007
low-3rd -0.034 0.067 -0.005
low-4th 0.255 0.081 0.047
2nd-low -0.242 0.066 -0.031
2nd-2nd -0.142 0.062 -0.020
2nd-3rd -0.222 0.064 -0.029
2nd-4th -0.090 0.071 -0.013
3rd-low -0.128 0.070 -0.018
3rd-2nd -0.183 0.064 -0.025
3rd-3rd -0.219 0.060 -0.029
3rd-4th -0.049 0.059 -0.007
4th-low 0.079 0.073 0.013
•4th-2nd -0.103 0.068 -0.015
4th-3rd -0.081 0.061 -0.012
4th-4th 0.0 -- 0.084bTable 4a, continued
Asymptotic
Variable Coefficient Standard Error Probability
Retirement Status
no -,no 0.0 -- 0.046b
yes •no 0.341 0.074 0.044
no -.yes 0.409 0.036 0.055
yes •yes 0.285 0.036 0.035
Family Status
single -.singlec 0.0 -- 0.066b
married -.married -0.004 0.033 -0.000
married •widowed 0.322 0.056 0.052
other change 1.319 0.089 0.360
Health Status
same 0.0 -- 0.067b
better 0.133 0.037 0.019
worse 0.006 0.030 0.001
Intercept -1.522 0.074 0.076b
Number of observations—22914
Log-likelihood —-5864.32
a. The standard errors have not been adjusted for repeated
observations for the same person.
b. The probability of moving in the base case. It is calculated by
evaluating all variables within the category (age, home equity
and income, retirement status, family status, or health status)
at zero and all other variables at their means. The A
probability for other attributes is the increase or decrease
relative to this base. For example, the probability that a move
occurs if a person retires is 0.046 +0.055.The probability
associated with the intercept is the probability of moving when
all variables are set to their sample means.
c. Includes single to single, divorced to divorced, and widowed to
widowed.Table 4b. Probit Estimates of Interval Hazards for Homeowners,
by Interval: 1969-1971, 1973-1975, 1977-1979.
1969-1971
Asymptotic
Variable Coefficient Standard ErrorA Probability
Age in 1969
58 0.0 0.071 b
59 0.017 0.086 0.002
60 0.068 0.084 0.010
61 -0.047 0.085 -0.006
62 -0.026 0.087 -0.003
63 -0.080 0.088 -0.010
Home Equity-Income Quartile
low-low -0.082 0.108 -0.012
low-2nd -0.001 0.111 -0.000
low-3rd 0.184 0.117 0,032
low-Ath 0.306 0.148 0.058
2nd-low -0.257 0.125 -0.033
2nd-2nd -0.173 0.127 -0.024
2nd-3rd -0.296 0.128 -0.037
2nd-4th 0.102 0.132 0.017
3rd-low -0.162 0.141 -0.022
3rd-2nd -0.368 0.141 -0.044
3rd-3rd -0.242 0.125 -0.032
3rd-4th -0.200 0.125 -0.027
4th-low 0.145 0.135 0.025
4th-2nd -0.342 0.152 -0.042
4th-3rd 0.003 0.116 0.001
4th-4th 0,0 -- 0.085b
Retirement Status
no -no 0.0 -- 0.054b
yes -+no 0.280 0.168 0.038
no -+yes 0.426 0.061 0.065
yes •yes 0.283 0.074 0.039
Family Status
single -.singleC 0.0 -- 0.062b
married •married 0.029 0.068 0.004
married •widowed 0.505 0.118 0.089
other change 1.634 0.164 0.397
Health Status
sate 0.0 0.064 b
better 0.179 0.072 0.026
worse 0.078 0.058 0.010
Intercept -1.592 0.109 0.079 b
Number of observations —6121
Log-likelihood —-1581.52Table 4b, continued.
Asymptotic
Variable Coefficient Standard ErrorA Probability
Age in 1969
58 0.0 0.079 b
59 -0.058 0.101 -0.008
60 -0.020 0.098 -0.003
61 -0.066 0.100 -0.009
62 -0.131 0.102 -0.017
63 -0.177 0.107 -0.023
Home Equity-Income Quartile
low-low -0.181 0.121 -0.028
low-2nd -0.269 0.141 -0.039
low-3rd -0.309 0.160 -0.044
low-4th 0.103 0.193 0.019
2nd-low -0.360 0.147 -0.049
2nd-2nd -0.165 0.133 -0.026
2nd-3rd -0.426 0.145 -0.055
2nd-4th -0.335 0.162 -0.046
3rd-low -0.049 0.160 -0.008
3rd-2nd -0.245 0.155 -0.036
3rd-3rd -0.364 0.160 -0.049
3rd-4th -0.046 0.146 -0.008
4th-low -0.100 0.159 -0.016
4th-2nd -0.221 0.140 -0.033
4th-3rd -0.104 0.126 -0.017
4th-4th 0.0 -- 0.099b
Retirement Status
no -'no 0.0 -- 0.036b
yes -,no 0.538 0.162 0.068
no •yes 0.465 0.092 0.055
yes -,yes 0.413 0.079 0.047
Family Status
single •singleC 0.0 -- 0.077b
married •married -0.109 0.072 -0.015
married -,widowed -0.138 0.146 -0.018
other change 1.457 0.207 0.436
Health Status
same 0.0 0.069 b
better 0.034 0.088 0.005
worse -0.028 0.069 -0.004





Variable Coefficient Standard ErrorA Probability
Age in 1969
58 0.0 0.064 b
59 -0.227 0.131 -0.024
60 -0.120 0.127 -0.014
61 -0.245 0.134 -0.025
62 -0.020 0.122 -0.002
63 -0.060 0.130 -0.007
Home Equity-Income Quartile
low-low -0.456 0.183 -0.050
low-2nd -0.191 0.179 -0.025
low-3rd -0.638 0.279 -0.061
low-4th -0.129 0.290 -0.018
2nd-low -0.474 0.215 -0.051
2nd-2nd -0.281 0.183 -0.035
2nd-3rd -0.074 0.180 -0.011
2nd-4th -0.135 0.199 -0.019
3rd-low -0.482 0.224 -0.052
3rd-2nd -0.092 0.162 -0.013
3rd-3rd -0.278 0.155 -0.035
3rd-4th -0.086 0.158 -0.012
4th-low -0.310 0.253 -0.038
4th-2nd -0.036 0.192 -0.005
4th-3rd -0.442 0.201 -0.049
4th-4th 0.0 -- 0.083b
Retirement Status
no -.no 0.0 -- 0.022b
yesno 0.467 0.212 0.039
no -.yes 0.730 0.171 0.077
yes •yes 0.412 0.146 0.032
Family Status
single •singleC 0.0 -- 0.054b
married -.married 0.098 0.099 0.010
married -.widowed 0.394 0.145 0.058
other change 1.468 0.314 0.390
Health Status
same 0.0 0.049 b
better 0.212 0.111 0.026
worse -0.025 0.093 -0.003
Intercept -1.656 0.194 0.060 b
Number of observations —3266
Log-likelihood —-695.06
1977-1.979Notes, Table 4b.
a. The standard errors have not been adjusted for repeated observations for
the same person.
b. The probability of moving in the base case. It is calculatedby
evaluating all variables within the category (age, home equity and
income, retirement status, family status, or health status) at zero and
all other variables at their means. The A probability for other
attributes is the increase or decrease relative to this base. For
example, the probability that a move occurs if a person retires in the
1977-1979 interval is 0.022 +0.077.The probability associated with
the intercept is the probability of moving when all variables are set to
their sample means.
c.Includes single to single, divorced to divorced, and widowed to widowed.Table 5.Probit Estimates of Interval Hazards for Renters,
All Intervals Combineda
Asymptotic
Variable Coefficient Standard Error aProbability
Age at Beginning of Period
58 0.0 -- 0,195b
59 0.135 0.101 0.040
60 0.196 0.095 0.058
61 0.118 0.094 0.034
62 0.075 0.092 0.021
63 0.091 0.093 0.026
64 0.098 0.115 0.028
65 0.129 0.117 0.037
66 0.149 0.135 0.044
67 0.117 0.142 0.034
68 0.207 0.164 0.062
69 0.035 0.176 0.010
70 0.219 0.225 0.066
71 0.398 0.235 0.127
Year at Beginning of Period
1969 0.0 -- 0.294b
1971 -0.197 0.056 -0.064
1973 -0.345 0.080 -0.106
1975 -0.426 0.106 -0.127
1977 -0.492 0.132 -0.143
Home Equity-Income Quartile
low-low 0.131 0.077 0.040
low-2nd 0.157 0.080 0.048
low-3rd -0.009 0.111 -0.003
low-4th -0.006 0.164 -0.002
2nd-low 0.209 0.090 0.066
2nd-2nd 0.044 0.085 0.013
2nd-3rd -0.006 0.089 -0.002
2nd-4th -0.236 0.122 -0.062
3rd-low 0.107 0.103 0.032
3rd-2nd 0.049 0.096 0.015
3rd-3rd 0.027 0.082 0.008
3rd-4th 0.099 0.084 0.030
4th-low 0.139 0.130 0.043
4th-2nd 0.069 0.110 0.021
4th-3rd 0.111 0.087 0.034
4th-4th 0.0 -- 0.212bTable 5, continued.
Asymptotic
Variable Coefficient Standard ErrorA Probability
Retirement Status
no -.no 0.0 -- 0.189b
yes -no 0.179 0.129 0.052
no -.yes 0.378 0.051 0.118
yes -.yes 0.160 0.053 0.046
Family Status
single •singleC 0.0 -- 0.209b
married •married 0.090 0.042 0.027
married •widowed 0.414 0.096 0.137
other change 1.187 0.138 0.438
Health Status
same 0.0 -- 0.212b
better 0.200 0.056 0.062
worse 0.108 0.044 0.033
Intercept .0.982 0.087 0.237
Number of observations5637
Log-likelihood-2954.0
a. The standard errors have not been adjusted for repeated
observationsfor the same person.
b.The probability of moving in the base case. It is calculated by
evaluating all variables within the category (age, home equity
and income, retirement status, family status, or health status)
at zero and all other variables at their means. The 8
probability for other attributes is the increase or decrease
relative to this base. For example, the probability that a move
occurs if a person retires is 0.189 +0.118.The probability
associated with the intercept is the probability of moving when
all variables are set to their sample means.
a. Includes single to single, divorced to divorced, and widowed to
widowed.Table 6. Median Housing Value, Equity, and (Non-Housing) equeathab1e























































































































a. All figures are in 1979 dollars.
Sample: All homeowners in the sample in adjacent years.Table 7. OLS Estimates of Change in Housing Equity for









58 -- - - - - - -
59 -491 833 187 3669
60 261 612 1773 2565
61 -l 629 -2772 2550
62 -33 511 1123 2095
63 -600 527 5841 2236
64 329 514 554 2088
65 -601 533 161 2237
66 -289 1093 4182 4912
67 1147 841 -5060 4110
68 567 734 -2509 3521
69 635 752 4954 3783
70 673 1065 -1189 5240
71 -1675 1092 -2076 5467
Year at Beginning of Period
1969 -- - - - - - -
1971 446 384 1698 1590
1973 -1651 341 -3534 1437
1975 1222 410 274 1838
1977 1365 552 -440 2609
Home Equity-Income Quartile
low-low 966 491 4683 2299
low-2rtd 1750 557 5219 2473
low-3rd 3593 692 5393 2872
low-4th 6182 1033 8396 3211
2nd-low 5 598 3007 2781
2nd-2nd 145 571 2683 2526
2nd-3rd 1560 579 1381 2783
2nd-4th 1384 718 9375 2821
3rd-low -1087 671 2114 3154
3rd-2nd -870 561 1916 2566
3rd-3rd -396 516 -4236 2360
3rd-4th 1374 565 4218 2376
4th-low -6005 813 -16377 2885
4th-2nd -3616 667 -13790 3160
4th-3rd -2742 604 -949 2324







no.4no -- -- --
yes •no 278 665 -2535
--
2487
no -+yes -257 370 -425 1353
yes •yes -189 312 2084 1206
Family Status
single -.singleb
married -.married 1834 334 -1025 1149
married •widowed 1149 683 -3577 2279
other change -4249 939 9251 2401
Health Status
same - - - - - - - -
better 18 301 1087 1184
worse -592 247 -1005 1062
Children
no - - - - - - - -
yes 463 195 -3172 855
Intercept - - - - - - - -
Number of observations —21224
a. The standard errors have not been adjusted for repeated
observations for the same person.
b. Includes single to single, divorced to divorced, and widowed to widowed.Table 8. Median Rent, by Stay versus Move and by Year,
Adjacent Year Renters.a
Year and Measure Stay Move
Median, 1969 $ 140 $ 132
Median, 1971 134 134
Median Change -4.69 1.07
% Change > 0 0.34 0.51
Median, 1971 134 131
Median, 1973 131 139
Median Change -6.36 5.89
% Change >0 0.34 0.58
Median, 1973 131 136
Median, 1975 121 135
Median Change -15.66 -8.00
% Change >0 0.15 0.42
Median, 1975 121 121
Median, 1977 120 139
Median Change -4.66 4.77
% Change >0 0.35 0.56
Median, 1977 132 132
Median, 1979 120 125
Median Change -10.60 -1.54
% Change >0 0.21 0.48
a. All figures are in 1979 dollars.
Sample: All renters in adjacent surveys.Table 9. Annual User Cost by Tenure Change a
Year and
Measure






Move Stay Move Stay Move
Median, 1969 $931 $1188 $1663 $1616 $1544 $1901
Median, 1971 1577 1574 1936 1936 2217 1523
Median Change 655 551 284 351 872 -167
% Change >0 0.81 0.63 0.77 0,68 0.68 0.46
Median, 1971 1542 1642 1905 1799 1692 2194
Median, 1973 1512 1397 1849 1862 2801 2107
Median Change -13 -26 -74 21 715 -93
% Change >0 0.47 0.47 0.38 0.52 0.59 0.48
Median, 1973 1506 1716 1882 1888 2042 1895
Median, 1975 1485 1738 1780 1904 3149 1653
Median Change -73 3 -152 -53 949 -39
% Change >0 0.42 0.50 0.29 0.47 0.66 0.48
Median, 1975 1462 1605 1813 1767 1749 2239
Median, 1977 1492 1738 1803 1869 2381 1885
Median Change 39 50 -28 53 758 -406
% Change >0 0.56 0.52 0.44 0.54 0.67 0.46
Median, 1977 1484 1702 1869 1928 2060 2300
Median, 1979 1400 1676 1764 1937 2492 2084
Median Change -98 -55 -129 -32 550 -321
% Change >0 0.39 0.45 0.28 0.46 0.64 0.40
a. All figures are in 1979 dollars.































































a. In base year.Appendix Table 2. Median Housing Value, Equity, and Non-Housing
Bequeathable Wealth, by Stay versus Move and
by Year, Continuous Homeowners.a
Bequeathable
Year
HousingValue Housin Equity Wealth
Stay in Move in Stay in Move in Stay in Move in
* Years* Years * Years* Years * Years *Years
1969* $29699 $35639 $25740 $29699 $27349 $44023
1971* 29871 35845 26884 28676 26525 41138
1973 32667 40017 28094 32667 24097 40709
1975 31019 40459 26973 33716 22927 31009
1977 32939 38330 29945 35934 21261 31168
1979 35000 40000 35000 40000 19408 29230
1969 29699 31679 25740 25740 27920 30274
1971* 30244 31364 26884 26884 26834 30729
1973* 32667 32667 28584 26134 24488 27442
1975 32367 32367 27160 26973 23148 27647
1977 33538 33538 29945 29945 21422 24126
1979 35000 35000 35000 33000 19358 23684
1969 29699 31679 25740 25938 27349 36801
1971 29572 35845 26884 28497 26525 34607
1973* 32667 32667 28584 28584 24052 31690
1975* 32199 33716 26973 26973 22627 36303
1977 33538 35634 29945 29945 20898 29284
1979 35000 37500 35000 35000 19210 27309
1969 29699 30491 25740 27719 27502 38379
1971 29572 32261 26884 28676 26601 35439
1973 32667 36524 27767 31034 24147 32626
1975* 31019 33716 26973 32367 22927 33716
1977* 33538 35934 29945 29945 20898 32684
1979 35000 39418 35000 35000 19280 28937
1969 29699 33659 25740 27125 27309 45206
1971 29572 33157 26884 28676 26443 42949
1973 32667 32667 28003 30707 23948 38710
1975 31732 35065 26973 31019 22859 37897
1977* 32939 35934 29945 35934 20898 36373
1979* 35000 40000 35000 35000 19020 40090
a. All figures are in 1979 dollars.Appendix Table 3. Median Rent, by Stay versus Move




































































































a. All figures are in 1979 dollars.Appendix Table 4. Median User Cost by Stay versus
Move, by Classification













































Med. Home Value,69-71 Movers and Stayers

















19671969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979
year-' lI.I.I. I
19691971 1973 1975 1977 1979
Fiyure Th
























1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979
yearFigure ic
Med. Beq. Wealth,'69-71Moversand Stayers
20000
10000
1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979







J—--. I - 1•










30000 o stayers 0
year969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979
































1973 1975 1977 1979
Med. Rent,'75-77 Movers and Stayers
1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979
year•o- slayers
-I- movers









1500 . . . .•
196719691971 1973197519771979
year
I • I • I•I
19691971 1973197519771979
year










































Med. User Cost,'77-79 Movers and Stayers
1800 - -0- stayers
-4-movers
1600-
1400--
1967